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TEACHING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SOME 
USES OF THEMES 
Carl Auerbach 
Since many of our readers are teachers of constitutional law, we try to in-
clude something about teaching in every issue. Here is an interview with our 
distinguished senior colleague, devoted to a few of the problems of the Constitu-
tional Law course. 
CC: You know the perennial arguments about whether 
Constitutional Law should be a first-year course or an upper-class 
course. Where do you stand on that one? 
CA: I believe very strongly that the law-school curriculum 
still has too much private law. Constitutional Law belongs in the 
first year, because it's a basic course and so different from the pri-
vate law courses. It's also a good transition course from college to 
the first year in law school because it deals with subject matter 
that should not be entirely unfamiliar to college graduates. 
CC: Which casebook do you use, and why? 
CA: I now use Gunther, but I don't have a very good reason 
for not using some others. I used the Lockhart-Kamisar-Choper 
book for many years and enjoyed it. I switched to Gunther only 
because a colleague was using it. Without undertaking a compar-
ative analysis, let me say that I particularly like two features of the 
Gunther casebook: (1) the cases aren't overedited; and (2) excel-
lent textual notes furnish historical background that I appreciate. 
I should add that students have been unhappy with both 
casebooks I have used. The volume of cases is now so great and 
each noteworthy case so long that the task of editing has become 
almost impossible. I always manage to refer to passages in class 
that the editors have chosen to omit. 
CC: What's the best topic with which to begin the course? 
CA: I begin with Gunther's pages 1-35, covering Marbury 
and its implications. Then I go to pages 1604-1614 (advisory 
opinions) because Marshall's argument in Marbury based on the 
judicial responsibility for deciding cases naturally leads to the 
topic of advisory opinions. Then back to pages 36-48 (Supreme 
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Court authority to review state court judgments), 48-57 (congres-
sional power over jurisdiction of federal courts), and so on. 
CC: When do you get to standing? Some of us have won-
dered whether justiciability should be postponed until fairly late 
in the course. It's certainly a logical topic after Marbury, but it's 
tough pedagogically to introduce it so early in the course. We've 
even considered some radical changes, such as beginning the 
course with the Bill of Rights. 
CA: I don't treat standing as a separate topic; I take it up 
when it is important for an understanding of substantive topics 
such as Congress's spending power. 
I would not approve beginning the course with the Bill of 
Rights. It is important that the student first think about the role of 
the Supreme Court in other areas, and particularly about federal-
ism and the separation of powers, before the issues raised by the 
Bill of Rights are presented. Beginning with the Bill of Rights is 
sometimes seen as a way to capture the students' interest at the 
very outset of the course. But I think it is a "cop out" from the 
effort to make other matters interesting to the student, an effort 
that I am certain can be successful. 
CC: How do you deal with the cynicism, or "legal realism" 
or whatever you want to call it, that so many students acquire 
after studying constitutional law for awhile? Or isn't it a problem? 
CA: It's a common misconception that private law is more 
rigorous than constitutional law. You can be very rigorous in an-
alyzing constitutional cases-it's just as good for teaching legal 
process as private law courses. And private law courses can also 
be usefully taught with a "legal realist" approach-to break down 
the idea of fixity and certainty in the law and to stress the impor-
tance of "policy"-notions of justice-in every branch of the law. 
CC: Pursuing that a little further, are there any places in the 
course where you try to impart the idea that the wording of the 
constitutional text is or ought to be decisive? 
CA: That's an interesting question, which raises the funda-
mental issue of the role of the Supreme Court in our society. In 
my opinion, some parts of the constitutional text must be given an 
historical meaning. It's interesting to ask why the Court ap-
proaches some parts of the text that way but not others. I'll have 
to admit that the Court has destroyed a lot of my best examples of 
clauses that ought to be given their historical meaning. I felt that 
way about "cruel and unusual punishment," for example-it's 
such an archaic term that I thought it should be given its archaic 
meaning. And who would have predicted that the Court would 
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say a "jury" may consist of fewer than twelve persons? We have a 
"living" Constitution, indeed. 
CC: Maybe we should ask about some particular topics. 
For example, what do you do with the abortion cases? (There's a 
recent book, reviewed in this issue, that offers an interesting the-
ory about the motivations of participants in the battle.) 
CA: Throughout the course, you have to decide what 
themes you're going to emphasize in particular contexts. Other-
wise, class discussions are likely to be too aimless. The abortion 
decisions bear upon many of the themes I like to pursue. 
First, there's the place of the Supreme Court in American his-
tory-most casebooks are weak on that. (And historical eras don't 
correspond to the tenures of the chief justices, as some writers im-
ply.) To what extent can we attribute the abortion decisions to 
developing constitutional doctrine? Or to changing conceptions of 
the role of women in our society? 
Second, what is the function in a democracy of a Supreme 
Court that has authority to declare acts of Congress and the states 
unconstitutional? Did the Supreme Court overstep its proper 
bounds in the abortion decisions? Prior to Roe, was the political 
process closed to those favoring the abolition of anti-abortion 
laws? Does the Supreme Court make sense when it defers to legis-
lative judgments in cases involving "economic" or "property" 
rights, but not "human" rights? Is the distinction justifiable? 
Third, what fundamental values does our constitutional law 
reflect? T.R. Powell, my constitutional law teacher, used to say 
that the Court is the only authoritative political science depart-
ment in the country because it not only discusses how choices are 
made between competing values but actually makes the choices. 
What fundamental values are reflected in the abortion deci-
sions? Why did the Court make the choice it did between the 
values that come into conflict in these decisions-a choice that 
was so difficult because each of the conflicting values is so 
important? 
Class discussion of the abortion decisions can be made espe-
cially valuable by asking students who favor them to try to per-
suade their classmates who oppose them that they are mistaken 
and vice versa. This can lead to the very important question of 
how a democratic society should conduct a dialogue as to the re-
spective merits of competing values, a question that loomed very 
large in the recent presidential campaign. 
Religion, of course, may properly be the source of one's 
moral values and ethical beliefs. But is it healthy in a democratic 
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society for people to defend these beliefs and values in the public 
arena solely on the ground that their religion commands them? 
That the Pope says so? 
Fourth, what are the "process" aspects of constitutional adju-
dication? For example, how does and should the Supreme Court 
determine the "legislative" facts underlying its choice of values? 
The abortion decisions provide excellent material for the discus-
sion of this issue. Judge Friendly, you know, criticized the Court 
in Roe v. Wade for not informing the parties beforehand of the 
"legislative" facts upon which it was relying and giving them an 
opportunity to refute or support them. How should the Court de-
cide when "life" begins? When "personhood" begins for purposes 
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments? 
F!fth and finally, what is the impact on society of particular 
constitutional decisions? What has been the impact of the abor-
tion decisions? Law teachers do next to nothing to assess the im-
pact of the Court's decisions. Such assessment is also necessary to 
evaluate the place of the Court in our history. 
So you see the abortion decisions provide excellent opportu-
nities for pursuing every major theme I think significant for an 
understanding of constitutional law. 
CC: To switch to something more prosaic: do you cover 
state taxation of interstate commerce? 
CA: No, because Gunther doesn't have anything on it. I 
used to love teaching it, but I am not certain students shared my 
love. I used this subject matter to demonstrate that the Court 
sometimes develops constitutional doctrines that are completely 
divorced from economic reality. 
CC: Do you deal at all with state constitutional law? 
CA: Only tangentially. For example, in Minnesota v. Clover 
Leaf-the plastic milk container easel-the Minnesota Supreme 
Court declared a state statute unconstitutional on federal equal 
protection and due process grounds. The company did not argue, 
and the Minnesota Supreme Court did not hold, that the statute 
was invalid under the state constitution's due process clause or 
equal protection doctrines. So the state attorney general obtained 
review by the U.S. Supreme Court that overturned the Minnesota 
Supreme Court's reading of the U.S. Constitution. So the case 
gives students a beautiful tactical lesson ~~at I emphasize: P~acti­
tioners must become accustomed to ratsmg state constitutiOnal 
issues. 
I. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981). 
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In addition, the opinion in Cloverleaf reiterates that a state 
constitution can be stricter than the federal Constitution. This 
makes it possible to discuss the additional question as to whether 
state courts should interpret their states' constitutions so as to 
reach results more protective of individual rights than the federal 
Constitution as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
This is all I try to do with state constitutional law. 
CC: Why shouldn't state courts read state constitutions as 
they wish? 
CA: Well, there's an argument that the possession of a fun-
damental right should not depend on the state in which one hap-
pens to live. The U.S. Supreme Court, therefore, should declare 
what these fundamental rights are for everyone. People are not 
enamored with the idea of the states as experimental laboratories 
for the protection of fundamental rights. 
The argument the other way, of course, is that the federal 
Constitution guarantees only a certain minimum of fundamental 
rights for everyone and state courts should feel free to interpret 
state constitutions so as to enlarge these rights. 
In any case, I find that this issue interests students and that 
they divide sharply on it. I think we should do much more with 
state constitutional law than we do now. 
CC: How much time should be spent on the old federal 
commerce cases? 
CA: I spend a lot of time on them, asking why the conserva-
tive decisions of the Lochner era were wrong. Is it because we 
now don't share the value they placed on freedom of contract? Or 
is it because they improperly refused to defer to legislative judg-
ments of policy? These cases are also excellent for a discussion of 
the basic themes I previously mentioned and set a good stage for 
the abortion decisions. 
CC: Some of your own views of the proper role of the Court 
were expressed in the book review you did for our first issue. In 
class, do you explicitly refer to Ely, Perry, and other contempo-
rary theorists of the Court's role? 
CA: Yes, indeed. 
CC: How do you teach the Steel Seizure Case? 
CA: Believe it or not, I used to take two weeks on that case, 
which I believe to have been wrongly decided. I follow Henry 
Hart's classic analysis of it, which is in the Hart & Wechsler Fed-
eral Courts casebook. Alan Westin's paperback book on the case 
provides additional background. I also read to the students the 
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passages from Truman's memoirs explaining why he acted as he 
did. 
Since Jesse Choper's book appeared, I also use the Steel 
Seizure Case to test his view that the Supreme Court should not 
get into separation-of-powers issues at all and see what the stu-
dents think of it. 
CC: What about the school busing cases? 
CA: My most important goal in discussing that topic is to 
raise "process" issues. There are significant differences about 
"legislative" facts in this area. Do blacks favor compulsory bus-
ing? Do whites? What have been the consequences of compul-
sory busing? Does it improve the education of black children? Of 
white children? Does it contribute to closer relations between 
black and white school children? What assumptions of fact is the 
Court making about busing, and are they valid? Consideration of 
these issues takes us outside the confines of the casebook. 
There is also a neglected legal question I like to raise about 
busing beyond the boundaries of a school district. The Constitu-
tion forbids state deprivations of equal protection. In the law of 
municipal corporations, school districts are just agencies of the 
state. So why isn't the state depriving black children of equal pro-
tection if any school district is doing so and, if so, why can't the 
state be ordered to adopt remedies that cover a whole metropoli-
tan area? 
CC: What themes do you develop in dealing with aid to pa-
rochial schools? 
CA: That subject is marvelous for exploring the Court's de-
velopment of doctrine. The decisions can hardly be described as 
consistent. So one must ask, Why is there so much confusion in 
this area? It's not due to the justices' lack of awareness of what 
the Court is doing. But once the Court takes the position that tax 
exemptions for churches are permissible, what other form of aid is 
as serious? So it's hard to explain why some other forms of aid 
are and some are not permissible. And the distinction between 
the values to be safeguarded by the establishment clause and those 
to be safeguarded by the free exercise clause becomes blurred. 
For example, compare the School Prayer Case with the Flag Sa-
lute Case. In the Flag Salute Case, the Court did not say that the 
schools had to abolish flag saluting, but only that the children of 
Jehovah's Witnesses could not be punished for refusing to salute 
the flag, but had to be excused from that exercise. In the School 
Prayer Case, the Court required the schools to abolish school-
sponsored prayers; it was not sufficient to excuse the children who 
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did not want to pray. Is there a coherent doctrine that explains 
the difference between the cases? Free exercise principles do not 
justify the difference. In the school I went to, nobody paid any 
attention to a kid who didn't pray, but anyone who didn't salute 
the flag ran the risk of a beating. 
The blurring between free exercise clause and establishment 
clause values is also exemplified in last Term's decision that a 
city's inclusion of a nativity scene in its annual Christmas display 
did not violate the establishment clause. 
CC: Do you use the pornography cases to exemplify the 
need for social scientific data? 
CA: Yes, indeed. Also the fundamental values theme. Alex 
Bickel stressed that pornography detracts from the quality of life, 
quite apart from any tendency it may have to induce antisocial 
behavior. 
CC: We almost forgot to ask you about Nazi marchers in 
Skokie. 
CA: I'm unorthodox about that issue, which grips students 
and makes them think deeply about the premises of the first 
amendment. As you know from my writings, I think it is easier to 
justify outlawing the Nazi party than it is to prohibit a march of a 
Nazi party that has not been outlawed. If society doesn't wish to 
proscribe an organization it's hard to justify discriminating 
against it when its members ask for a permit to march. Yet the 
case raises other questions. Beauharnais has been assumed to be 
dead. But Justice Blackmun thought the Skokie case should have 
been used to reexamine Beauharnais. Actually, what the Nazis 
tried to do in Skokie is worse than group libel. The Illinois courts 
said, in effect, that the Jewish people in Skokie who were too sen-
sitive to witness the Nazi demonstration could stay at home, shut 
their doors, draw their blinds, and thereby protect themselves 
from what might otherwise be "fighting words." That's a hell of a 
solution-it's exactly what happened when the storm troopers 
took to the streets in Germany. Hitler's successful battle for the 
streets was pivotal in his strategy for seizing power. So the Skokie 
case has connotations that are very painful for me. And I think 
these connotations were unjustifiably ignored by the courts. I 
have no praise for the ACLU in this case. 
CC: As the article on pornography in this issue explains, 
feminists are also trying to revive Beauharnais. 
We've talked about busing. Now what about affirmative 
action? 
CA: This is an issue that divides students, but which they 
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are very reluctant to discuss. I begin by asking whether Justice 
Powell's decisive opinion in Bakke makes sense. I agree with Cal-
abresi that it's an invitation to hypocrisy. Law schools disregard 
the opinion every day, and no one pays any attention. Justice 
Powell's opinion encouraged this disregard by indicating he 
would not look over the shoulders of the educational administra-
tors to see whether they were complying because academic free-
dom was involved. I ask the students whether they are satisfied 
with this resolution of the issue of affirmative action. 
I also use Bakke to discuss the validity of the concept of 
group, rather than individual, constitutional rights. I find that stu-
dents will express themselves freely on this issue, though many 
who reject the concept of group rights do not think it necessarily 
follows that they must reject affirmative action. 
CC: Do you discuss the proposed Equal Rights 
Amendment? 
CA: Not at any length. I do raise the question whether the 
sex discrimination cases in the casebook would be decided differ-
ently under the ERA. 
